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ABSTRACT
Available studies on asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism within Europe are
invariably based on macro-economic evidence: such evidence is abundant but often contradictory. This
paper takes a different route by using micro-economic data. We use the information contained in the
balance sheets of individual banks (available from the BankScope database) to implement a case-study on
the response of banks in France, Germany, Italy and Spain to a monetary tightening. The episode we study
occurred during 1992, when monetary conditions were tightened throughout Europe. Evidence on such
tightening is provided by the uniform squeeze in liquidity, which affected all banks in our sample. We study
the first link in the transmission chain by analysing the response of bank loans to the monetary tightening.
Our experiment provides evidence on the importance of the "credit" channel in Europe, and thus on one
possibly important source of asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism. We do not find
evidence of a significant response of bank loans to the monetary tightening, which occurred during 1992,
in any of the four European countries we have considered. However, we find significant differences both
across countries and across banks of different dimensions in the factors that allow them to shield the supply
of loans from the squeeze in liquidity.
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This paper studies the monetary transmission mechanism in Europe, a topic that has
attracted new attention following the start of the EMU. Asymmetries in the monetary
transmission mechanism across the members of the monetary union could be a critical
factor in determining the effects of the single monetary policy. Consider, as an example,
an EMU-wide symmetric inflationary shock. The ECB would respond by raising
short-term interest rates. If the consequences of the monetary contraction were
different from one country to another--both in terms of the timing and the magnitude
of the responses of the relevant real variables--the output cost of maintaining price
stability could be quite unevenly distributed across EMU.
We consider a potentially important channel for such asymmetries, related to
the response of bank lending to monetary policy. When looking, in Europe, for
asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism, it is natural to start from
banks. As it is well known, banks are at the center of financial  intermediation in
continental Europe. The share of bank loans in total debt liabilities of non-financial
firms is 85 per cent in Germany, 80 in France, 95 in Italy and 77 in Spain—by
contrast, in the U.S., this share is about 30 per cent.
In this paper we use balance sheet information from a sample of 651 banks
from four EU states (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) to study how bank lending
responded to an episode of monetary tightening. The episode we investigate occurred
during 1992. As opposed to the four continental countries, British monetary policy
was looser in 1992 than it had been in 1991: this is the reason why we excluded the
UK from our sample of large EU states.
 When the central bank tightens monetary policy by squeezing bank reserves,
it can generate a corresponding reduction in the supply of bank loans. There are two
ways in which a bank can prevent this from happening. It can change the composition
of its liabilities by issuing instruments not subject to a reserve requirement (such as
CD’s or interbank loans); alternatively it can sell bonds. If this does not happen, and
the supply of loans is reduced, the monetary contraction will affect the real economy,
unless firms can substitute at no cost bonds and commercial paper for loans. This
effect (known as the “credit channel”, see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) works on
the supply side and amplifies the more traditional “money channel”--i.e. the demand
effect of a monetary contraction, which affects new marginal spending by modifying3
borrowing conditions and by affecting asset prices, and thus the market value of
wealth.
Our use of micro data to study the transmission of monetary policy from the
central bank to banks is motivated by the well-known observation that
macroeconomic time-series are ill-suited to identify a “credit” channel from a
“money” channel: the money channel works through banks' liabilities, and the credit
channel works through their assets, but assets and liabilities are tightly related by
accounting identities, thus posing a difficult identification problem. For this reason the
evidence proposed by macroeconomic studies which look at output and price
fluctuations in response to shifts in the quantities of loans and deposits is rarely
decisive (see  Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). On the contrary, micro-economic data
allow one to identify the presence of a credit channel by testing the specific empirical
implication of the credit view: namely that the responses of banks (and firms) to a
shift in monetary policy should differ depending on their characteristics.  Small banks,
for instance, find it more difficult to insulate their loans' portfolio from a squeeze in
central bank liquidity because they typically cannot substitute CD’s and  interbank
loans for deposits at no cost. Moreover, Kashyap and Stein (1997b), and Kashyap,
Stein and Wilcox (1993) show that, in the case of the U.S., small banks are typically
“weak” (that is their share of cash+securities+reserves over total assets is low) and are
thus unable to use their liquid assets as a buffer.
So far, tests of the credit channel based on the importance of bank
characteristics in determining the response of loans to a shift in monetary policy have
been limited to U.S. data. Our paper is the first study of this kind concerning Europe.
The result of our analysis is a new twist in the study of asymmetries in the monetary
transmission mechanism in Europe. In this area too, macroeconomic data, have been
unable to detect significant asymmetries in the transmission mechanism 
1. Studies based
on macroeconomic data typically look at the impact of a shift in interest rates on
inflation and output country-by-country. Such evidence, however, is hardly decisive.
First, the standard errors are often large, so that one can seldom reject the hypothesis
of symmetry even if the point estimates are very different across countries. Second,
the estimates are not robust to the 'Lucas critique' since they are based on samples
                                                
1 See Gerlach and Smets 1995, Ramaswamy and Sloek 1997, Barran, Coudert and Mojon 1997, Britton
and Whitley 1997,  Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi 1998, Kieler and Saarenheimo 1998,  Cecchetti
1999.4
from a pre-EMU monetary regime--and one of the main effects of EMU is precisely
that of changing the way European monetary policy is conducted. More importantly,
the macroeconomic evidence on asymmetries in monetary transmission is mute to the
question of which are the sources of the observed asymmetries--thus providing no
guidance for policymakers who wish to do something to reduce them.A first attempt at
using micro data to document the asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism
has been provided by  Maclennan et al. (1998) who examine the European housing
market.
A limit of this paper is that, by concentrating on banks, we can study just the
first link in the chain of monetary policy transmission. An obvious extension would
investigate the response of European firms to a similar monetary tightening (see, for
example, Kashyap et al.,1993 for the US case). This will be the object of a separate
paper.
The evidence reported in this paper also sheds light on the possibility that the
ECB may run into a “liquidity trap”. There is widespread concern, at the start of
EMU, that the ECB may face a period of deflation, that is a situation in which
monetary policy may become ineffective. In the traditional IS-LM framework the
liquidity trap occurs when the LM curve is flat and monetary policy thus becomes
powerless. If, however, monetary policy also works through a credit channel, then an
expansion will shift the IS curve outward (more precisely, the CC, credit and
commodities, curve in the notation of Bernanke and Blinder, 1988) via the effect of
bank liquidity on the supply on loans, and thus on consumption and investment.
Finding that the credit channel is important inside EMU would thus be good news for
the ECB, were it to face conditions of deflation.
2
The paper is organised as follows. We start explaining why we chose 1992 for
our case study. We then describe our data, our econometric specification and our
results, both with respect to the empirical relevance of the credit channel, and  to the
induced asymmetries in the transmission mechanism across the EMU.
                                                
2 Note, however, that the credit channel is not the only mechanism which could avoid a liquidity trap:
any situation in which monetary policy can shift the IS curve would produce such result. An obvious
alternative are wealth effects in the consumption function.5
2  The case study
Our empirical strategy runs as follows. We first identify an episode of synchronised
shift in monetary policy: the EMU-wide tightening of monetary conditions which
occurred during 1992. As an indicator of the stance of monetary policy we use a
measure of bank liquidity: cash plus reserves. This variable is affected by the
intervention of the central bank in the market for bank reserves, but varies across
individual banks. Looking at  thisvariable, we document an important shift in the
supply of banks’ liquidity during 1992. The next step consists in identifying  the
impact of the squeeze in liquidity on the supply of loans by individual banks: we do
this by testing whether the observed differences across banks are consistent with their
characteristics, in particular with their size and with the strength of their balance
sheet.
We started by considering data for banks in six European countries: two core
EMU states (France and Germany), two peripheral EMU states (Spain and Italy), plus
Sweden and the UK. As we shall explain later on, the final analysis was restricted to
the four continental countries.
Our micro-data come from BankScope, a financial database covering 9,400 world
banks.
3 The database contains financial information collected from the banks’ annual
reports and re-classified in a standard format in order to make them comparable across
countries.  The data are available in panel format from 1988. We have used
unconsolidated balance sheet information for the following banking categories:
commercial banks, saving banks, cooperative banks, real estate mortgage banks, medium
and long term credit banks.  The Bankscope panel is not balanced: we therefore reduced
the size of the sample excluding those banks for which some observations on one or more
of the relevant variables were missing.
3  Measuring monetary policy in Europe
Our case study depends crucially on a correct identification of the shift in monetary
policy. It is by now well established (see, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans, 1999) that monetary policy is best identified by concentrating on the market
for bank reserves because this is the market where the central bank intervenes
                                                
3 BankScope is collected by Bureau van Dijk, a private institution and IBCA, an international rating
agency.6
directly. Moreover, wider monetary aggregates are contaminated by demand shocks.
In Figure 1 we give a very stylised representation of the market for bank reserves in
Europe.
The demand schedule is determined by the behaviour of banks. It is negatively
sloped: the demand for reserves depends on the quantity of bank deposits, which are
negatively related to the opportunity cost of holding money. The supply schedule is
piecewise: it includes two flat sections and a vertical one. The interest rates on the two
standing facilities provide an upper and a lower bound to the overnight rate. Banks
can deposit funds with the central banks at the deposit rate, i
min, and borrow funds
from the central bank at the marginal rate, i
max. Therefore, the overnight rate cannot be
lower than the deposit rate, nor can it be higher than the marginal lending rate: it
fluctuates inside a corridor. The upward sloping segment of the supply schedule is
vertical, consistently with a central bank that fixes the volume of bank reserves by
using open market operations, independently of the overnight rate.
Figure 1: The Market for Bank Reserves in Europe
If the central bank targets the overnight interest rate, exogenous monetary
policy shocks will be reflected in fluctuations of the overnight rate, while movements
in bank reserves will mainly be driven by demand shocks. This is because the impact
of demand shocks on the overnight rate would be sterilized by the central bank so that
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Bank Reserves7
central bank targets the level of bank reserves, exogenous monetary policy shocks will
be reflected in movements in reserves (see Bernanke and Mihov, 1998).
It is well established that the  Bundesbank and the other European central
banks in our sample have followed an interest rate targeting rule
4. This explains why
interest rates are the variable traditionally used to measure the stance of monetary
policy in studies of the transmission mechanism based on macro data. However,
using, as we do, cross-sectional data on banks from different countries, interest rates
cannot be very informative: here fluctuations in interest rates would simply represent
country dummies. On the other hand, we have plenty of variation in the level of
reserves, which we observe at the individual bank level. We thus extract a measure
monetary policy from fluctuations in reserves, by identifying those fluctuations which
are supply driven. We do this by analysing simultaneously movements in reserves, in
real interest rates 
5 and in output gaps. The variables are observed at the end of the
year and are reported in Table 1.
We note two major shifts in real interest rates, occurring in 1992 and 1993,
respectively. 1992 is a year of monetary tightening; 1993 is one of monetary
loosening. However, only in 1992 we can attribute the shift in reserves to monetary
policy: during this year interest rates and reserves move in opposite directions, and
output gaps do not signal any major fluctuation in the cycle.  During 1993, instead,
real interest rates and reserves move in the same direction, and the output gap signals
a recession: the contraction in bank reserves that we observe in 1993 is thus likely to
be the result of demand shocks.
Table 1 also shows the behaviour of bank reserves
6 for all banks in our sample,
in each of the six countries: the value of reserves is expressed in US dollars at 1991
exchange rates.
7 We note immediately that the shift in bank reserves during  1992
wasrather homogeneous across continental Europe. Sweden and the UK, instead, are
                                                
4  Policy reaction functions for European Central Banks are estimated by Bernanke and Mihov 1997,
Clarida and Gertler 1996. Dornbusch et al., 1998.
5 As a proxy for policy rates we use three-month Euro-rates; real rates are built using the realised CPI
inflation rate.
6 Our measure of monetary policy is affected by changes in the compulsory reserves coefficients. In
practice we have only one occurence of such a modification: in France, where in 1992 the reserve
coefficient on sight deposits was reduced from four per cent to one per cent. We have dealt with this
case by considering the shift in reserves net of the effect of the change in the compulsory reserves
regime.
7 We use constant exchange rates because current exchange rates would bias our measure of the change
in monetary policy, being affected by the fluctuations of the U.S. dollar against all  the European
currencies which occurred during 1992.8
different in that there is no evidence of a monetary tightening in 1992—in fact UK
monetary policy was looser in 1992. Moreover, we have very few observations (15)
for Sweden. For these reasons we limit our empirical analysis to the four continental
European states, and we studythe effects of monetary policy during 1992 only. W e
thus do not exploit the panel dimension of the data set: rather, we concentrate on a cross-
section for a single year.
We further selected our sample by excluding those banks whose lending activity
was marginal (defined as banks featuring a loans-to-total assets ratio of less than 20 per
cent at the end of 1991) and those likely to have been involved in a merger (defined as
banks whose total assets increased by more than 50 per cent in the course of 1992). Table
2 summarizes the properties of our selected sample. This includes 156 French banks
out of a total of 1823, 221 German banks out of 3716, 153 Italian banks out of 368,
121 Spanish banks out of 323. Medium-size and large banks are well represented in
the sample (the sample includes over 90 per cent of all banks with total assets in
excess of 100 million U.S. dollars) but very small banks are under-represented 
8.
However, a comparison with the universe of banks covered by the OECD shows that
the banks in our sample account for a very large fraction of the overall banking
industry, as measured by total loans: 81 per cent in France, 70 per cent in Germany,
84 in Italy and 92 per cent in Spain.
4  Identifying the “lending channel”
Since output gaps remain relatively flat between 1991 and 1992, we interpret the shift
that we observe in the quantity of loans as a movement along an unchanged demand
curve, driven by a shift in supply.
As discussed above, the main empirical prediction of the lending view is that
the effects of monetary policy on banks depend on their characteristics, and are thus
heterogeneous. We aim at capturing these cross-sectional differences by using two
variables: the ‘strength’ and the ‘size’ of a bank's balance sheet.
Following Kashyap and Stein (1997b) we measure the strength of a balance
sheet by the sum of three items, cash, securities and reserves, as a fraction of total
                                                
8 Based on the average number of branches per bank, Cerasi et al. (1998) conclude that BankScope is a
good approximation of the German and French commercial banking systems, but it slightly over-
represents big banks for the other major European countries.9
assets. The idea is that a balance sheet is 'strong' when it is liquid, thus allowing a
bank to insulate the supply of loans from fluctuations in monetary policy.
Banks of similar size might have balance sheets of different strength, thus
inducing them to respond differently to monetary policy. Size, moreover, can capture
elements of the lending view that are not related to the strength of the balance sheet:
larger banks might find it easier to issue a variety of market instruments (such as
certificates of deposit) which also can shelter their lending from shifts in monetary
policy.
We thus divide our sample in ten deciles. The deciles are constructed using the
distribution of banks’ total assets for all countries in our sample. Table 3 reports this
distribution. By construction the total number of banks in each decile is constant at
65. In each cell of Table 3 we report, country by country, the number of banks in the
decile and the percentage of those banks over total banks within each country.  If the
distribution of banks in each country  was equal to the European distribution, such
number would be 0.10. Higher values indicate a higher concentration of banks in that
decile for that particular country. We observe a rather uniform distribution of banks
across the four countries:there is no evidence of asymmetries in the size distribution
of banks acrossthe four European countries included in our sample.  To make our
analysis comparable with that of  Kashyap and Stein (1997b) consider that in their
sample banks are divided in three groups: the 95th percentile defines ‘small’ banks,
that is banks with total assets less than U.S.$ 1 million; medium-size banks are those
contained in the 95
th to 99
th percentiles, and large banks are in the top percentile. The
European banks in our sample are larger than the U.S. banks considered by Kashyap
and Stein: the 3
rd decile in our sample contains banks with assets between U.S.$ 615
and 950 million.
As regards the relative ‘strength’ of the banks in our sample we observe (see
Table 4) a rather homogeneous distribution within countries, with the only exception
of the German banks belonging to the upper two deciles of the distribution—which
are relatively “weaker” than smaller German banks. Across countries we note that
banks in Italy and Spain are relatively stronger—possibly a consequence of the large
stocks of public debt issued in these countries, and of the significant bank holdings of
such debt.
To provide a first visual impression of the relevance of the lending channel we show, in
Table 5, the monetary tightening and the response of bank loans for each decile of our10
sample. First we note that the monetary tightening was rather uniformly distributed,
across banks of different size, in France and Spain, while in Germany and Italy it is
concentrated among larger banks. The response of loans to the monetary tightening is
uniformly very low.
We explore further this first evidence in the next section by implementing an econometric
analysis of the responses of bank loans to monetary policy.
5  Econometric evidence




























where DLoans denotes the percentage change in loans from 1991 to 1992;  DReserves
denotes the percentage change in bank reserves over the same period;.  Strength is our
measure of balance sheet strength [(cash+securities+reserves)/total assets] at the end of
1991;  DECILEj   are ten dummy variables discriminating banks by  decile of the
distribution on total assets of all four countries in our sample for 1991.
The parameters in these equations provide information on  the presence of a
credit channel by describing the response of bank loans to the shift in monetary policy,
allowing for the possibility that such response be non-linear and a function of both the
size and the strength of a bank. The regression measures  Size serves Re Loans ¶ ¶ ¶ 2 and
Strength Size serves Re Loans ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ 3 . Under the null that the credit channel operates
both effects should be significant. The size effect should be positive but declining
from the lower to the upper decile of the distribution; the strength effect should be
negative.  The estimation method is OLS with  heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors. Each equation also includes dummies to take account of outliers: 6 dummies for
Germany, 5 for France, 3 for Spain and 5 for Italy 
9. Our results are shown in Figures 2
and 3 that are based upon the estimates reported in Table 6.
                                                
9 Outliers are defined as banks with residual larger, in absolute value, than twice the standard error of
the regression. The outliers are Caixabank, Banco Mapfre, Banco de Credito Finanzia in Spain;
Euromobiliare SpA, Credito Romagnolo, Credito Italiano, Banca Internazionale Lombarda, Banca di
Credito di Trieste SpA in Italy; Volksbank Bad Reichenhall, Svenska Handelsbanken (Niederlassung
Frankfurt), Ost-West Handelsbank AG, Deutsche Handelsbank AG, Credito Italiano Bank, Bank11
Overall we find no evidence for a lending channel of the transmission of monetary
policy in the four EMU countries we study. The test for this hypothesis, namely of a zero
response of loans to a change in reserves, (reported in Table 6) confirms the visual
impression reported in Table 5 above: the null is never rejected.
From the viewpoint of understanding the possible role of the lending channel in
determining asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism inside EMU one could
stop here: asymmetries cannot be ascribed to a difference across countries in the response
of bank loans to monetary policy—at least in the four countries we consider, and at least
based on the evidence from our case study.  This result, however, is obtained from the
aggregation of banks of different size and strength: the way these two variables combine
to produce the total impact on bank loans of a change in reserves differs interestingly both
across banks of different size and strength, and across different countries.
We shall comment our results by country, starting from France. France is the only
country where the aggregate result is confirmed  decile-by-decile: neither the total impact,
nor its components are significant, with the possible exception of the third  decile which
displays a positive and significant impact of monetary policy on loans, cancelled by the
compensating effect of balance sheet strength.
For Germany our results show that the largest banks (those belonging to the upper
40 percent of the distribution) use their strength to shield their loans from the effects of
monetary. Notably, as shown in Table 4, the average strength of large German banks is
relatively small: one interpretation of this result is that strength is important, the more so,
the ‘weaker’ a bank’s balance sheet. The effects are non significant in all other deciles of
the distribution, with the exception of the first. The smallest German banks respond to the
squeeze in liquidity by expanding their loans--contrary to the prediction of the credit
view—and this impact is compensated by a positive effect of the strength of their balance
sheet—again, contrary to what the credit view would predict. The analysis of individual
bank balance sheets belonging to this percentile shows that small banks, holding a small
amount of securities, respond to the cut in reserves by expanding their loans--probably to
reap the benefit of the increase in intermediation margins that accompany higher interest
rates. The expansion in loans is financed through an increase in deposits—an option that
is only available to banks that hold excess reserves. Consider, for example, the case of
                                                                                                                                           
Kreiss AG in Germany; SBT - Batif SA, National Bank of Kuwait (France) SA, Caisse Nationale de
Crédit Agricole CNCA, Banque Révillon, Banque de Réalisations de Gestion et de Financement in
France.12
Bankhaus Carl F. Plump & Co. from Bremen: between 1991 and 1992 reserves fall by 20
per cent, while loans increase by 9 per cent and deposits by 5 per cent.
The same behaviour of small banks characterizes Italian and, to a lesser extent,
Spanish banks. On the contrary, neither the size, nor the strength of banks are significant
in determining the response of loans to monetary policy for large banks in these countries.
6  Conclusions
So far, the available empirical evidence on asymmetries in the monetary transmission
mechanism across Europe was mostly limited to studies based on macroeconomic data.
This literature often suggests that the credit channel could be one important factor lying
behind the observed asymmetries (see e.g. Kashyap and Stein, 1997b, 1997c.)
Our case study of the monetary tightening of 1992 in Europe finds no evidence of
a lending channel in the response of bank loans to monetary policy. Such result is
explained by different behaviour of banks across different  deciles of the European
distribution and across different countries. Small banks in Germany, Italy and France, use
their excess liquidity to expand deposit and loans in presence of a monetary policy
restriction. Large German banks use the strength of their balance sheets to insulate loans
from monetary policy fluctuations; loans of banks in other  deciles do not react to
monetary policy in any country.
The apparent absence of a credit channel in France is consistent with the evidence
suggesting that the French financial market is the most “ anglo-saxon” among the
continental European markets 
10. Interestingly this also holds for bank-centred financial
systems such as Germany and Italy. The underdevelopment of financial markets (and thus
the difficulty that firms face when attempting to substitute out of bank loans) could still
be a serious problem if the absence of a response of total loans hides a shift in their
composition, i.e. a reallocation of loans from small to large firms.
Kashyap and Stein (1997a) try to assess the importance the lending view for
Europe simply by looking at summary statistics, without running regressions. They look
at banks and firms separately. Their analysis  of banks is based on two indicators: the
importance of small banks, and the health of banks. Based on these two indicators, they
assign grades to countries: the extremes are grade A--which denotes countries where the
sensitivity of the lending channel to monetary policy is weak--and grade C, which denotes
                                                
10 For instance securities represent 15 per cent of total liabilities of French non-financial enterprises.
The same percentage is 20 in the U.S., 19 in the U.K., 6 in Germany, 5 in Italy, 9 in Spain.  The data13
a strong sensitivity of the lending channel. The grades are as follows (as reported in Table
6 of Kashyiap and Stein, 1997a) the first grade refers to the importance of small banks,
the second to bank health): B-C for France, C-B for Germany, B-C for Italy and B-B for
Spain. These rankings do not show significant asymmetries across countries—although
our econometric results indicate a uniform A-grade for all countries.  Interestingly,
however, when they consider, along with the bank factors, two firm-related factors--the
relative importance of small firms, and the availability, to firms, of non-bank finance--that
is when they consider the second link in the lending channel chain,  they come up with a
ranking that is closer to ours, except for Italy: Italy C-, France B/C, Germany B, Spain B.
This evidence confirms the need to complement the findings in the present paper with an
analysis of firms' response to a shift in the supply of bank loans.
Finally, our results provide a new framework for thinking about the effects of the
ongoing consolidation of the European banking industry. Strength is the key factor in
determining the response of large banks to monetary policy—very significantly in
Germany where, as discussed above, large banks are relatively weak. The strength of the
large Spanish and Italian banks in our sample could be related to the high level of public
debt in those countries, and to the large bank holdings of such debt—a factor that is likely
to become less important over time. If the large German banks provide a benchmark for
the consolidation of the industry, then strength will become a much more important factor
in shaping the response of European banks to monetary policy.
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Table 1: The monetary tightening as measured by the change in banks’
liquidity (cash + reserves)











France 1991 156 1,626 0.2 7.2
1992 156 1,099 -32.4 -0.6 9.6
1993 156 1,148 4.4 -3.5 4.3
1994 151 1,121 -2.3 -2.4 4.5
1995 147 1,321 17.8 -2.1 2.9
1996 140 1,689 27.9 -2.5 1.7
Germany 1991 221 314 3.6 4.4
1992 221 283 -9.7 2.8 5.4
1993 221 258 -9.1 -0.6 1.7
1994 221 240 -6.8 -0.3 2.7
1995 212 254 5.8 -1.1 2.0
1996 207 285 12.3 -1.6 1.8
Italy 1991 153 1,272 1.4 6.5
1992 153 1,158 -9.0 0.2 8.4
1993 152 735 -36.5 -2.6 4.0
1994 151 876 19.2 -2.3 5.1
1995 141 1,000 14.1 -1.1 4.9
1996 136 993 -0.6 -2.3 4.3
Spain 1991 121 426 4.1 7.5
1992 121 397 -6.8 2.1 10.0
1993 121 374 -5.7 -1.3 4.1
1994 121 414 10.6 -1.4 4.0
1995 119 417 0.6 -1.3 5.0
1996 117 448 7.5 -2.1 3.2
Sweden 1991 15 1,482 1.9 5.5
1992 15 1,491 0.6 -0.6 8.8
1993 15 1,529 2.6 -3.8 3.0
1994 15 1,333 -12.8 -2.2 5.6
1995 15 3,027 127.1 -0.9 6.4
1996 15 2,795 -7.7 -1.5 4.5
UK 1991 77 581 -0.7 6.6
1992 77 1,229 111.5 -2.7 4.4
1993 77 1,225 -0.3 -2.9 3.5
1994 76 1,326 8.3 -0.8 3.7
1995 75 1,695 27.8 -0.4 3.3
1996 71 1,678 -1.0 -0.2 4.0
Note: Balance sheet data are converted from national currencies into US dollars using a constant (1991)
exchange rate. Bank liquidity is equal to reserves. The Output Gap is the deviation of actual GDP from
potential GDP as a percentage of potential GDP. The Real Short-Term Interest Rate is the Three-month
euro-rates minus annual CPI inflation. All data observed at the end of period.
Source: Bank Liquidity: Authors' computation on data from the BankScope Data-set (by Bureau Van
Dijk and IBCA).
Exchange Rate: IMF, IFS, November 1997 (end of period market exchange rate).
Output Gap: OECD, Economic Outlook, December 1998.16
Table 2: Assets and Number of Banks in OECD statistics, BankScope and our
sample (1991).
OECD Bankscope Our Sample
France
Number of banks 1823 183 156




Number of banks 3716 248 221




Number of banks 368 161 153




Number of banks 323 138            121
Total assets as percentage of total assets of all
OECD recorded banks
100 93.2 91.6
Note: BankScope sample (see source below) is limited to banks with no missing observations in the
relevant variables in 1991. Our sample is limited to banks with: (i) a ratio loans/assets > 20%; (ii) a
variation in assets between 1992 and 1991 < 50%.
Source: Authors' computation on data from the BankScope Data-set (by Bureau Van Dijk and IBCA);
IMF, IFS, November 1997 (end of period market exchange rate).
OECD, Bank Profitability, 1998.17
Table 3: Distribution of the 651 Banks in Our Sample by Total Assets in 1991.
1st decile 2nd decile 3rd decile 4th decile 5th decile 6th decile 7th decile 8th decile 9th decile 10th decile Total
<315$ mil. <615$ mil. <950$ mil. <1,500$ mil. <2,080$ mil. <3,000$ mil. <4,500$ mil. <7,500$ mil. <17,000$ mil. <307,200$ mil.
France
number 22 19 18 12 12 13 15 13 12 20 156
% 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.13 1
Germany
number 18 23 23 27 20 20 18 28 24 20 221
% 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.09 1
Italy
number 9 15 14 14 22 17 17 14 13 18 153
% 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.12 1
Spain
number 16 8 10 12 11 15 15 10 16 8 121
% 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.07 1
Total
number 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 66 654
% 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.40 0.40
Note: Deciles are computed on total assets of all countries in 1991.
Source: Authors' computation on data from the BankScope Data-set (by Bureau Van Dijk and IBCA).
Table 4: Average Relative Strength of Banks for Each Decile of our Sample.
1st decile 2nd decile 3rd decile 4th decile 5th decile 6th decile 7th decile 8th decile 9th decile 10th decile Total
<315$ mil. <615$ mil. <950$ mil. <1,500$ mil. <2,080$ mil. <3,000$ mil. <4,500$ mil. <7,500$ mil. <17,000$ mil. <307,200$ mil.
France 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.41 0.38 0.40 0.34 0.45 0.42
Germany 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.38 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.37 0.24 0.32 0.38
Italy 0.52 0.55 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.54 0.47 0.51 0.42 0.51 0.50
Spain 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.40 0.54 0.46 0.41 0.48 0.44 0.45 0.45
Note: Deciles are computed on total assets of all countries in 1991. Relative Strength denotes: (Cash+Securities+Reserves)/Assets.
Source: Authors' computation on data from the BankScope Data-set (by Bureau Van Dijk and IBCA).18
 Table 5: Change in: Bank Liquidity, Loans, Securities, and Deposits for Each Decile of our Sample in 1992 .
1st decile 2nd decile 3rd decile 4th decile 5th decile 6th decile 7th decile 8th decile 9th decile 10th decile Total
<315$ mil. <615$ mil. <950$ mil. <1,500$ mil. <2,080$ mil. <3,000$ mil. <4,500$ mil. <7,500$ mil. <17,000$ mil. <307,200$ mil.
France
Bank Liquidity -0.360 -0.542 -0.331 -0.276 -0.351 -0.280 -0.406 -0.469 -0.322 -0.317 -0.324
Loans 0.013 0.033 -0.091 -0.007 0.042 -0.053 0.069 0.071 0.070 -0.072 -0.051
Securities 0.039 0.075 0.031 0.073 0.125 0.204 0.068 0.047 0.243 0.418 0.382
Deposits 0.048 0.136 -0.023 0.081 0.160 0.147 0.074 0.076 0.117 0.138 0.132
Germany
Bank Liquidity -0.116 0.177 0.055 0.119 0.143 0.101 0.266 0.052 -0.186 -0.143 -0.097
Loans 0.065 0.061 0.020 0.095 0.046 0.091 0.043 0.098 0.059 0.027 0.041
Securities 0.215 0.181 0.069 0.093 0.027 0.034 0.067 0.127 0.276 0.260 0.224
Deposits 0.112 0.117 0.034 0.094 0.026 0.056 0.041 0.125 0.399 0.199 0.187
Italy
Bank Liquidity 0.008 -0.016 0.029 0.015 -0.042 0.100 0.078 -0.185 -0.093 -0.103 -0.090
Loans 0.108 0.218 -0.016 0.106 0.090 0.069 0.093 0.093 0.089 0.105 0.100
Securities 0.016 0.082 0.080 0.109 0.062 0.107 0.166 0.189 0.163 0.239 0.213
Deposits 0.048 0.155 0.089 0.098 0.063 0.091 0.115 0.135 0.115 0.189 0.167
Spain
Bank Liquidity -0.337 0.106 -0.412 -0.191 -0.199 -0.176 -0.210 -0.220 -0.187 0.057 -0.068
Loans 0.167 0.204 0.021 0.112 0.117 0.109 0.118 0.038 0.105 0.081 0.090
Securities 0.033 0.150 0.128 0.151 0.080 0.155 0.109 0.181 0.182 0.201 0.182
Deposits 0.063 0.216 0.054 0.122 0.099 0.137 0.107 0.134 0.131 0.152 0.139
Note: Deciles are computed on total assets of all countries in 1991. Bank liquidity is equal to reserves.
Source: Authors' computation on data from the BankScope Data-set (by Bureau Van Dijk and IBCA).19
Table 6: Estimation Results: response of  loans to a change in bank liquidity (bj and cj coefficients)
N F R
2 constant 1st decile 2nd decile 3rd decile 4th decile 5th decile 6th decile 7th decile 8th decile 9th decile 10th decile
<315$ mil. <615$ mil. <950$ mil. <1,500$ mil. <2,080$ mil. <3,000$ mil. <4,500$ mil. <7,500$ mil. <17,000$ mil. <307,200$ mil.
coeff. st. err. coeff. st. err. coeff. st. err. coeff. st. err. Coeff. st. err. coeff. st. err. coeff. st. err. coeff. st. err. coeff. st. err. coeff. st. err.
France 156 134.3 0.53 0.025 -0.034 0.010 0.063 0.030 -0.009 0.034 -0.005 0.004 0.002 0.006 -0.005 0.013 0.002 0.018 0.001 0.013 0.005 0.003 -0.009 0.019
0.021 0.036 0.024 -0.079 0.036 0.023 0.033 0.011 0.012 -0.004 0.009 0.010 0.018 -0.006 0.030 -0.010 0.018 -0.007 0.005 0.021 0.028
Germany 221 549.5 0.51 0.076 -0.020 0.005 0.009 0.010 -0.034 0.028 0.005 0.009 -0.021 0.017 0.023 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.013 0.004 0.021 0.007 0.023 0.010
0.009 0.019 0.003 -0.007 0.006 0.015 0.024 -0.001 0.006 0.027 0.018 -0.035 0.021 -0.009 0.004 -0.004 0.003 -0.024 0.021 -0.014 0.010
Italy 153 60.9 0.59 0.114 -0.063 0.007 -0.238 0.134 0.359 0.079 0.115 0.118 0.056 0.067 -0.091 0.034 0.011 0.011 -0.031 0.047 -0.017 0.030 -0.018 0.009
0.009 0.056 0.007 0.254 0.125 -0.357 0.075 -0.091 0.118 -0.033 0.054 0.060 0.026 -0.029 0.021 0.034 0.043 0.011 0.028 0.026 0.014
Spain 121 95.2 0.69 0.127 -0.026 0.054 0.000 0.004 0.035 0.029 -0.010 0.019 -0.039 0.087 0.092 0.027 -0.098 0.087 0.092 0.091 0.081 0.093 -0.141 0.049
0.016 0.030 0.056 -0.012 0.011 -0.004 0.017 0.026 0.016 0.012 0.070 -0.098 0.021 0.107 0.102 -0.064 0.075 -0.055 0.081 0.113 0.043
The following equation has been estimated by OLS. The table reports a, bj and cj coefficients, where j identifies the decile. Standard errors (in italics)
are heteroscedasticity consistent (White). Dummy variables are added to each equation to control for outliers (defined as observation with residuals




























DLoans  = (LOAN92 -LOAN91)/LOAN91 DReserves = (M92-M91)/M91
LOAN92 = total loans at the end of 1992 LOAN91 = total loans at the end of 1991
M92 = reserves in 1992 M91 = reserves in 1991
STRENGTH = cash+securities+reserves at the end 1991
DECILEj   =  dummy variables discriminating banks by decile of the distribution on total assets of all countries in 1991.
Wald Test for  DLoans/DReserves = 0,  Chi-square (20): France (0.05, prob. 0.82), Germany (0.28, prob. 0.59),
Italy (0.18, prob. 0,67),   Spain (1.19, prob. 0.21.)Fig. 2:  Response of Loans to Monetary Policy in our Sample: Point Estimation and 95% Confidence Interval.
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586 591 596 601 606 611 616 621 626 631 636 641 646Fig. 3a: The Response of Loans to Monetary Policy in our Sample: the effect of "Size" and "Strength".
France Germany Italy Spain
Note: Effect of size:               ; effect of strength                   ; total effect      

































261 266 271 276 281 286 291 296 301 306 311 316 321Note: Effect of size:               ; effect of strength                    ; total effect      
See table 6 for complete estimation results and statistics.
Fig. 3b: The Response of Loans to Monetary Policy in our Sample: the effect of "Size" and "Strength".
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